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DEFINING TORTURE
David Sussman t
In the On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche observes that "only
that which has no history is definable."' Torture has a long and varied his-
tory, and has indeed proved surprisingly resistant to any very clear defini-
tion in current debates about its use and justifiability.2 The United Nations
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment 3 defines torture as
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suf-
fering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
4
Unfortunately, the convention does not address the central question
of what counts as the infliction of requisite sort of suffering here, or the
broader context that might have to be in place to distinguish torture from
other forms of coercion, manipulation, or intimidation. Donald Rumsfeld
has insisted that the humiliations of Abu Ghraib were not "technically
speaking" torture, but merely "abuse", although he has yet to explain just
what the technical distinction between torture and abuse is supposed to be.5
In Northern Ireland, Britain employed what it called "interrogation in
depth" against suspected Irish Republican Army sympathizers, using tech-
niques that have been taken up by Israel and the United States (sometimes
t David Sussman is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
1 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 80 (Walter Kaufmann trans.
1989).
2 See EDWARD PETERS, TORTuRE 154 (1985).
3 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
4 Id. art. 1.
5 U.S. Dep't of Def., News Transcript: Defense Department Operational Update Briefing,
http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040504-secdefl423.html
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described as "torture lite").6 Such interrogation involves the hooding of
prisoners, keeping them in a room pervaded by the din of a large engine,
fan, or loud music, depriving prisoners of food, water, sleep or medical care,
and forcing them to stand at great lengths or to assume and maintain "stress
positions". 7 In the British case, the European Court of Human Rights ulti-
mately concluded that these techniques, while constituting "inhuman and
degrading treatment," were still "not [quite] torture." 8 Israel's Supreme
Count came to largely opposite conclusions. 9 Similar questions have arisen
with regard to keeping prisoners naked or in darkness, subjecting them to
extremes of temperature, prolonged questioning or isolation, or the admini-
stration of disorienting drugs, shaking, shouting, and mockery or threats
directed to things that they hold dear. One might consider whether amputa-
tions or sterilizations conducted under anesthesia constitute torture, or the
use of tasers or pepper spray to subdue inmates, or detention in squalid and
unsafe conditions.
Much recent discussion of torture focuses on the severity of suffer-
ing involved. In a notorious memo, then Assistant Attorney General Jay
Bybee argues that to constitute torture under Section 2340 of Title 18 of the
U.S. Code, physical pain must be inflicted on a captive "of [such] an inten-
sity akin to that which accompanies serious physical injury such as death or
organ failure."' 0 What Bybee has in mind is unclear. It is hardly obvious
that there is any distinctive level of pain that is associated with death (which
can be quite painless) or organ failure (here the degree of pain would seem
to have much to do with just what organ failed, and in what way, and in
what broader context). Section 2340 also recognizes the infliction of "pro-
longed mental harm" as torture, where this harm results from the threat of
physical pain or death, the administration of mind-altering substances (or
the threat thereof), or the threat that another person will be subjected to any
of these things.'1 Bybee interprets this condition to mean that mental harms
constitute torture only when they engender some long-lasting psychological
6 See JOHN CONROY, UNSPEAKABLE ACTS, ORDINARY PEOPLE: THE DYNAMICS OF
TORTURE 187 (2000).
7 Mark Danner, The Logic of Torture, 51 NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, June 24, 2004, at
70.
8 See CONROY, supra note 6, at 187 (discussing Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1978)).
9 HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 46(2)
150), reprinted in TORTURE 165-183 (Sanford Levinson ed. 2004).
10 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND
TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 155 (2004) [hereinafter Bybee
Memo].
" 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(A)-(D) (2000).
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disorder. 12 This construction is hardly plausible. On this reading, a person
could not have been psychologically tortured if he died during or shortly
after his interrogation. Whether torture occurs here would now depend on
such factors as the victim's psychological resilience, or the future availabil-
ity of effective psychotherapy and medication.
There are no doubt better understandings of severe mental and
physical pain than what Bybee offers. However, in the remainder of my
remarks I want to reconsider torture is in light of another, relatively ne-
glected connotation of suffering: passivity. What is distinctive of torture is
not just the infliction of intense pain (however that is to be understood), but
the experience of a kind of forced passivity in a context of urgent need, a
context in which such passivity is experienced as a kind of open-ended ex-
posure, vulnerability, and impotence. In order to make sense of the difficult
cases above, we need to consider not just the intensity of pain that might be
inflicted upon someone, but the alienation of the victim from his own bodily
and emotional life that forced passivity before pain and fear can engender.
For torture to occur, its perpetrators and victims must see them-
selves as standing in a particular kind of relationship with one another, and
understand that the other understands this as well. Characteristically, vic-
tims of torture see themselves as being completely at the mercy of their
tormentors. A victim of torture must be unable, to shield herself in any sig-
nificant way, and must be unable to effectively evade or fight back against
her tormenter. I may intentionally inflict great pain in a fight in order to
make my foe do something; I may gouge his eyes in order to get him to stop
choking me. Nevertheless, insofar as my opponent is not helpless before
me, my eye-gouging is not an instance of torture, even though I am forcing
him to comply with my desires by inflicting pain. Police who use tear-gas to
disperse a crowd are not engaging in torture, regardless of how painful the
gas may be. In these cases, the victims still have it within their power to
resist or mitigate the violence done to them: by retreating, devising ways of
protecting themselves, or countering their assailants with new threats of
their own. In contrast, the torture victim realizes that he has no room to ma-
neuver against his antagonist, no way to fight back or protect himself, and
he must realize that his antagonist operates in an awareness of this as well. 13
12 Bybee Memo, supra note 10, at 120.
13 "The other person, opposite whom I exist physically in the world and with whom I can
exist only as long as he does not touch my skin surface as border, forces his own corporeality
on me with the first blow .... Certainly, if there is even a minimal prospect of successful
resistance, a mechanism is set in motion that enables me to rectify the border violation by the
other person. For my part, I can expand in urgent self-defense, objectify my own corporeal-
ity, restore the trust in my continued existence .... "Jean Amiry, Torture, in ART FROM THE
ASHES 126 (Lawrence L. Longer ed. 1995)). 13
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The victim sees her tormentor as someone who can do anything he
wants to her, who does not have to worry about answering any challenges or
claims that the victim (or her representatives) might press against him. The
torturer confronts no moral or legal impediments stemming from his vic-
tim's will, but is limited only by his own desires and interests, or the desires
and interests of those he serves as an agent. The most intimate and private
parts of a victim's life and body become publicly available tools for the
torturer to exploit and enjoy as he will. The victim is completely exposed,
while the torturer is free to conceal or misrepresent anything he likes. Typi-
cally, victims are kept in the dark about where they are, why they are being
tortured, who might be making the ultimate decisions about their fates, how
long they have been confined, or even whether it is day or night. The
asymmetry of power, knowledge, and prerogative is absolute: the victim is
in a position of complete vulnerability and exposure, the torturer in one of
perfect control and inscrutability. Torture, even of the "lite" variety, strives
to immerse its victim in a world of absolute arbitrariness and unpredictabil-
ity. Anything may be done to the victim at any time. Questioning may be
inexplicably abandoned, or shifted to obviously pointless subjects. Periods
for eating and sleeping may be shifted or interrupted without warning, the
environment may suddenly go from hot to cold; escalating pain may inex-
plicably be assuaged with some small seeming kindness. 14
Normally a human being, or even an animal, confronts the world as
an arena of action. The world presents itself as a broad context of threats
and problems, but also as a fund of resources, in which the creature sees
open ended possibilities of meeting its needs and responding to these chal-
lenges. Our emotions are the ways in which we see a situation as calling for
some sort of response, as a sort of task inviting the exercise of our powers.
Pain and pleasure are something our most basic awareness of the degree to
which these basic powers and capacities are successfully realized in our
environment. The thought here is fundamentally Aristotelian: a living thing
just is a dynamic system of activities of perceiving, evaluating, and respond-
ing to an environment, a system that aims to maintain itself relative to vari-
ous impediments and opportunities. This definition has an evident circular-
ity, but it need not be vicious, at least if we can say more about just what
these characteristic sorts of impediments and opportunities are, and what
might count as the relevant sorts of response to them.
Such ongoing self-maintenance is not what the torture victim ex-
periences. The victim's physical world is controlled so as to make it impos-
sible for him to orient himself. That world is designed to close off any hope
that the victim might harbor of coming to understand what he sees or learn-
14 For a fuller discussion of these considerations, see David Sussman, What's Wrong with
Torture?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1 (2005).
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ing more at his own initiative. He cannot hope to find out what is going on,
and he can no longer approach his physical world as a context of potential
resources or an arena of action. The torturer makes his victim experience a
world that he cannot affect, except in the very specific ways the torturer is
trying to elicit. The victim cannot fight back, cannot seek new tools, weap-
ons, or strategies, and cannot appropriate any materials to his uses. His
situation is dire (he is threatened, he must do something). Yet his basic ca-
pacities of perception and action confront not just a difficult or confusing
world, but a world that is manifestly designed to give those powers no pur-
chase.
Normally, we experience a kind of primitive unity of our emotions,
bodies, and actions. We are our bodies, insofar as the body is the substance
in which we express our emotional responses to the world in our actions.
But the normal context of torture systematically negates this primitive ex-
pressive unity of mind and body. Unable to investigate or strive against the
world, the torture victim instead confronts his own feelings, and his own
body, as the primary source of threats and resources. Living agency is thus
turned on itself, struggling not with its world through its feelings, but with
its feelings as its world. Body and emotion are no longer integral parts of
the victim's agency, but instead become what the victim, insofar as he can
be perceptive or active at all, must exert himself against.
As torture progresses through greater pain, fear, disorientation and
hopelessness, even the victim's body and emotions cease to be such an
arena for action. The natural progression of torture makes the individual
come to experience his body and feelings as being impossible to resist or
strive against, just as he had been made to experience the physical world as
impossibly alien and unmanageable. Elaine Scarry notes that "in prolonged
and acute pain the body often beings to interpret all sensations as pain.'' 15
The self is driven further inward, ultimately becoming not a locus of activ-
ity, but rather a point of pure passivity, a vanishing point defined by the
direction of the outside forces that have taken on what had been his active
powers. The victim does not act through his body on the world; rather, the
world acts through his body on him, where that 'him' is understood as just
as a locus of suffering, as the thing that just has to "take it." The Central
Intelligence Agency's Kubark interrogation manual describes this condition
as the "debility-dependence-dread state" marked by limitless anxiety and
helplessness, a condition that results when the victim is "cut off from the
known and reassuring, and.., plunged into the strange .... 16
15 ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 55 (1985).
16 DANNER, supra note 10, at 17 (citing CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, KUBARK MANUAL
(1968)).
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In At the Mind's Limits, Jean Amery recounts his torture at the
hands of the Nazis. 17 For Amery, the experience was pervaded by
Astonishment at the existence of the other, as he boundlessly asserts him-
self through torture, and astonishment at what one can become oneself:
flesh and death. The tortured person never ceases to be amazed that all
those things one may, according to inclination, call his soul, or his mind,
or his consciousness, or his identity, are destroyed when there is that
cracking and splintering in the shoulder joints. That life is fragile is a tru-
ism he has always known.... But only through torture did he learn that a
living person can be transformed so thoroughly into flesh and by that,
while still alive, be partly made into a prey of death. 18
I do not think that the sort of "living death" that Amery refers to
here is just a rhetorical flourish. If what I have said is correct, Amery's de-
scription may be literally accurate. What Amery seems to have experienced
is not death: that is, not the cessation or absence of thought, movement,
consciousness, and activity. Instead, Amery seems to have experienced
something like the opposite of life, a kind of active awareness of himself as
a mere thing, as nothing more than that which is acted upon, a mere medium
of another's "boundless" assertion. Normal death at least has the solace that,
when one's living is over, so too is the ability to be aware of one's self as
such. In torture, however, the victim remains alive to himself as a point of
absence that confronts what had been himself (his body and feelings) as a
fundamental threat. A living thing, I claimed, is essentially a system of ac-
tivities meant to sustain itself through changes in its environment. In torture,
this relation is reversed: The victim experiences himself as boundlessly
threatened, but here there is little for that threatened self to be but simply
that which is so threatened. If life calls for a special kind of respect or con-
cern from us, then torture, insofar as it aims to transform life into a kind of
anti-life, must be morally offensive in a way that is different from and per-
haps greater than even killing.
17 JEAN AMERY, AT THE MIND'S LIMITS: CONTEMPLATIONS BY A SURVIVOR ON AUSCHWITZ
AND ITS REALITIES (1980).
18 Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
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